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OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
 After spending seven years in federal prison for 
unlawful possession of a firearm, Arthur Ferguson began 
serving a three-year term of supervised release. That term of 
supervised release was revoked after Ferguson was convicted 
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in Pennsylvania state court of sexually assaulting a 10-year-
old girl. The United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania sentenced Ferguson to an additional 
24 months’ imprisonment, to run consecutively to his 10 to 20 
year state sentence. Ferguson appeals, claiming that the 
District Court deprived him of due process when it considered 
his “bare prior arrest record” to determine his sentence. 
I 
 On February 7, 2001, Ferguson pleaded guilty in the 
District Court to one count of possession of a firearm by a 
convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). 
Ferguson was sentenced to 84 months’ imprisonment, to be 
followed by three years of supervised release.  
 Two years into that term of supervision, the United 
States Probation Office petitioned the District Court to revoke 
Ferguson’s supervised release because he had committed 
another crime. The Probation Office informed the District 
Court that Ferguson had been convicted and sentenced in the 
Delaware County Court of Common Pleas on seven counts of 
aggravated indecent assault on a person less than 13 years 
old, one count of criminal solicitation of a person less than 13 
years old, and eight counts of indecent assault on a person 
less than 13 years old. Ferguson was sentenced to a term of 
10 to 20 years’ confinement in state custody, to be followed 
by seven years’ probation.  
 In light of his state court convictions, Ferguson did not 
contest in the District Court that he had violated the 
conditions of his supervised release. The parties and the 
District Court agreed that although Ferguson’s violation 
carried a range of 30 to 37 months’ imprisonment under the 
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United States Sentencing Guidelines (USSG), the statutory 
maximum sentence was 24 months’ imprisonment followed 
by three years of supervision. Neither party asked the Court to 
impose a sentence less than the 24-month statutory maximum, 
but Ferguson requested that the sentence run concurrently 
with his state sentence, while the Government sought a 
consecutive sentence.  
After hearing the parties’ arguments, the District Court 
explained the factors it considered in fashioning Ferguson’s 
sentence. One of these factors was Ferguson’s criminal 
history, which the Court recounted as follows: 
I have also reviewed the original presentence 
report . . . , and the defendant has a long and 
serious criminal history. 
Adjudicated delinquent for criminal trespass in 
1979 at the age of 13. Simple assault 1980. 
Adjudicated delinquent. Criminal attempted 
rape, indecent assault and indecent exposure in 
1981 at the age of 15. Criminal attempt and 
theft by unlawful taking. Adjudicated 
delinquent at the age of 16 in 1982. Adjudicated 
delinquent in 1983 in State Court for second 
degree burglary in Delaware County. At age 17 
adjudicated or adjudged delinquent. Disorderly 
conduct and hindering prosecution. 
Also, he has adult convictions. In 1985 at the 
age of 19, criminal attempt in Delaware County 
Common Pleas Court. In 1986 at the age of 20, 
robbery and conspiracy, Delaware County 
Common Pleas Court. In 1988 at the age of 21, 
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disorderly conduct also in Delaware County. In 
1989 possession of marijuana for personal use 
at the age of 23. And at the age of 25 in 1991, 
knowing or intentionally possessing a 
controlled substance, manufacture, delivery or 
possession with intent to deliver. Another drug 
conviction in 1995, again in Delaware County 
Common Pleas Court. 
And one, two, three, four, five, arrests for 
burglary, burglary, possession of an instrument 
of crime, criminal conspiracy and homicide. It 
appears that the defendant is incapable of 
abiding by the law.  
App. 25–28. The District Court then remanded Ferguson to 
the custody of the Bureau of Prisons to be imprisoned for 24 
months, running consecutive to his state sentence, with no 
period of supervised release to follow. The Court asked 
counsel for each party if they had any objections, but neither 
did. Ferguson filed this timely appeal.  
II 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 3231 and 3583. We have jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3742 and 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  
 As Ferguson acknowledges, his failure to preserve his 
objection to the District Court’s arrest record reference at 
sentencing means we review it only for plain error. Fed. R. 
Crim. P. 52(b); see also United States v. Flores-Mejia, 759 
F.3d 253, 256 (3d Cir. 2014) (en banc). Under this standard, 
Ferguson bears the burden of showing: “(1) error, (2) that is 
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plain or obvious, and (3) that affects a defendant’s substantial 
rights.” United States v. Goodson, 544 F.3d 529, 539 (3d Cir. 
2008) (citing Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 467 
(1997)). “If all three conditions are met, an appellate court 
may then exercise its discretion to notice a forfeited error, but 
only if . . . the error seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity, 
or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. (citation 
omitted). 
III 
A 
Ferguson relies on our opinions in United States v. 
Berry, 553 F.3d 273 (3d Cir. 2009), and United States v. 
Mateo-Medina, 845 F.3d 546 (3d Cir. 2017), to argue that the 
District Court plainly erred by considering arrests that did not 
lead to convictions. In both of those cases, the defendants’ 
Presentence Investigation Reports listed arrests for charges 
that did not result in convictions and did not offer any 
evidence regarding the alleged offenses. Ferguson’s 
Presentence Investigation Report does the same. He argues 
that—like the sentencing courts in Berry and Mateo-
Medina—the District Court deprived him of due process of 
law by relying on his arrest record in determining his 
sentence. 
In Berry, in addition to considering the relevant factors 
under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) at sentencing, the district court 
explicitly relied on the two defendants’ arrests. It was 
necessary to do so, the court stated, because their lack of prior 
criminal convictions did not adequately reflect the 
“seriousness of their criminal exposure in the past. The fact 
that they were charged with crimes and then, the prosecution 
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was dropped because nobody showed up to prosecute or 
something like that, means that their criminal history points 
were probably understated.” Berry, 553 F.3d at 279. It was 
“rather obvious,” the court continued, that “reading between 
the lines . . . the reason [defendant Berry] doesn’t have any 
actual adult convictions is because of the breakdowns in the 
court—in the state court system—and not because of 
innocence.” Id. at 277. The sentencing judge’s speculation 
was based on an inaccurate reading of the defendants’ 
Presentence Investigation Reports. Even more importantly, 
the court relied on mere arrests to determine the sentences. 
And that constituted plain error that required resentencing. Id. 
at 281.  
We recognized in Berry that while the Guidelines 
permit district courts to consider “[p]rior similar adult 
criminal conduct not resulting in a criminal conviction,” id. 
(alteration in original) (quoting USSG § 4A1.3(a)(2)(E)), they 
also caution that “[a] prior arrest record itself shall not be 
considered for purposes of an upward departure.” Id. 
(alteration in original) (quoting USSG § 4A1.3(a)(3)). Despite 
the absence of an upward departure in Berry, we concluded 
that any reliance by the district court on the arrests 
themselves amounted to plain error: “unsupported speculation 
about a defendant’s background is problematic whether it 
results in an upward departure, denial of a downward 
departure, or causes the sentencing court to evaluate 
the § 3553(a) factors with a jaundiced eye.” Id. (citation 
omitted). We explained that under the Due Process Clause, 
“[a] defendant cannot be deprived of liberty based upon mere 
speculation.” Id. at 284. Accordingly, we held “that a bare 
arrest record—without more—does not justify an assumption 
that a defendant has committed other crimes[,] and it 
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therefore cannot support increasing his/her sentence in the 
absence of adequate proof of criminal activity.” Id.1   
 We applied the principles articulated in Berry in 
Mateo-Medina, where the district court sentenced the 
defendant—a citizen of the Dominican Republic who pleaded 
guilty to illegal reentry—based in part on its consideration of 
arrests that did not lead to convictions. 845 F.3d at 551. As in 
Berry, the district court made clear that there was a direct link 
between the arrests and the sentence to be imposed: 
I also cannot overlook the defendant’s rather 
extensive . . . interaction with the criminal 
justice system. But there were as I counted, I 
believe seven arrests, two convictions in three 
states since 1988. So, the defendant who was in 
this country initially illegally since at least the 
80s has engaged in conduct which to the 
Court’s view belied and made ring hollow a 
                                                 
1 Indeed, it is only reliance on an arrest record bereft of 
facts, and thus resulting in unsupported speculation, that 
raises due process concerns. We have permitted sentencing 
courts to consider arrests if the underlying conduct has been 
proven by a preponderance of the evidence. See United States 
v. Zabielski, 711 F.3d 381, 391 (3d Cir. 2013) (explaining that 
“a bare arrest record—without more—does not justify an 
assumption that a defendant has committed other crimes” 
(quoting Berry, 553 F.3d at 284), but that a sentencing court 
nevertheless “may consider ‘[p]rior similar adult criminal 
conduct not resulting in a criminal conviction’” (alteration in 
original) (quoting USSG § 4A1.3(a)(2)(E)), “as long as that 
conduct has been proven by a preponderance of the evidence” 
(citation omitted)). 
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little bit his desire to merely come to America 
to seek a better life. 
Id. at 549. Both parties recommended that the defendant be 
sentenced to time served, which would have translated to 
roughly six months’ imprisonment, but the court sentenced 
him to a year and a day. Id. We concluded that the court’s 
consideration of Mateo-Medina’s bare arrest record had 
tainted its sentencing decision, as forbidden by Berry. Id. at 
552.  
We did not arrive at this conclusion mechanically. We 
did not, for example, hold that any reference by the district 
court to prior arrests not leading to conviction amounted to 
plain error. Instead, we carefully examined the court’s 
statements in context to discern whether or not it actually 
relied on Mateo-Medina’s arrest record when fashioning his 
sentence. Id. at 552–54. In doing so, we rejected the 
Government’s attempt to distinguish the case from Berry. The 
Government argued that the court’s reference to Mateo-
Medina’s bare arrests reflected the court’s “doubt as to [his] 
credibility in stating his reasons to return to the United States, 
not his criminal nature.” Id. at 552. We found this explanation 
implausible, given that Mateo-Medina had only two prior 
convictions, one for fraudulently obtaining a passport five 
years earlier (the offense for which he was removed) and the 
other a 15-year-old conviction for driving under the influence. 
It “strain[ed] credulity” to argue, as the Government did, “that 
the sentencing court was referring only to these two 
convictions as an extensive interaction with the criminal 
justice system.” Id. We thus concluded that the district court 
had erred in the same way as had the Berry court: it 
impermissibly allowed a bare arrest record to influence the 
sentencing decision. Id. at 554. When such influence is 
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evidenced in the record, a new sentencing is required. 
Notwithstanding a district court’s subsequent consideration of 
factors appropriate under the Guidelines or § 3553(a), most 
likely the court will not have been able to “unring the bell,” 
and ipso facto the defendant will have been prejudiced by the 
error. Id. In other words, when a district court relies on mere 
arrests to determine a sentence, it is likely to engage in the 
kind of “unsupported speculation” forbidden in Berry and 
Mateo-Medina and thus to commit “plain error that affects 
substantial rights.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b).  
B 
According to Ferguson, the District Court relied on his 
bare arrest record to determine his consecutive sentence of 24 
months’ imprisonment. In support of this argument, he cites 
the Court’s reference to his arrests in its recitation of his 
criminal history, which in turn he asserts factored into the 
sentencing decision. The Court’s mention of these arrests, 
preceded by its observation that “the defendant has a long and 
serious criminal history,” App. 25, suffices, on Ferguson’s 
view, to establish that these arrests affected the Court’s 
sentencing decision, rendering his sentence unconstitutional. 
We disagree. 
The district courts in Mateo-Medina and Berry erred 
not because they mentioned prior arrests, but because they 
relied on them. Accepting Ferguson’s invitation to infer such 
reliance from any reference to bare arrests, without 
considering the full context of the reference, would be both 
illogical and inconsistent with the deference we owe district 
courts’ sentencing decisions, which are by their nature 
individualized and context-specific. See, e.g., United States v. 
Bungar, 478 F.3d 540, 543 (3d Cir. 2007) (noting that 
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appellate courts adopt a “highly deferential” stance toward 
district courts’ application of the § 3553(a) factors (citation 
omitted)). In order to show plain error, Ferguson must 
therefore bridge the gap between reference and reliance. It 
does not suffice merely to compare, as Ferguson does, the 
District Court’s reference to his arrest record to the remarks 
made by the sentencing judges in Mateo-Medina and Berry. 
Ferguson correctly observes that, at least in isolation, the 
District Court’s reference to his arrest record contains echoes 
of the references we found problematic in those cases. But 
those references were problematic only insofar as they 
indicated actual reliance by the court on the arrests when 
determining a sentence.  
In this appeal, we are not persuaded that the District 
Court actually relied on Ferguson’s arrests in determining his 
sentence. It is true that the Court mentioned the arrests in its 
recitation of Ferguson’s “long and serious criminal history.” 
App. 25. But that characterization of his criminal history was 
accurate regardless of the arrests, as made abundantly clear 
by the many convictions and adjudications of delinquency the 
Court had noted just seconds before it mentioned Ferguson’s 
arrest record. Beginning at the age of 13 in 1979, Ferguson 
was adjudicated delinquent on six occasions as a minor and 
went on to accumulate six adult convictions, including serious 
crimes like robbery and drug trafficking offenses, prior to his 
federal conviction for possession of a firearm by a felon and 
his state conviction for sexual assault, which triggered the 
supervised release violation in this case. After reciting this 
criminal history, which by any definition would qualify as 
“long and serious” on its own, the District Court mentioned, 
without emphasis or reliance, Ferguson’s five prior arrests for 
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burglary, possession of an instrument of crime, criminal 
conspiracy, and homicide.  
In contrast to the sentencing transcript in this appeal, 
arrests not leading to convictions were central to the 
sentencing decisions we vacated in Berry and Mateo-Medina. 
The district court in Berry, faced with two defendants with no 
adult convictions, used the fact of their arrests to “read[] 
between the lines.” 553 F.3d at 277. Based on the arrests 
alone, it found that their “criminal history points” probably 
understated their propensity to commit crimes. Id. at 279. 
And had those arrests not been deemed evidence of 
criminality, the court’s sentencing decision might well have 
turned out differently. Similarly, in Mateo-Medina it was 
evident that the arrests influenced the court’s sentencing 
calculus because they were essential to its finding that the 
defendant had a “rather extensive . . . interaction with the 
criminal justice system,” 845 F.3d at 549.  
 Ferguson is right to note that—despite the tradition of 
deference to sentencing courts’ ability to examine all relevant 
information—the “rule of Berry and Mateo-Medina exists for 
good reason.” Ferguson Br. 9. But fidelity to that rule does 
not compel a reflexive inference that the mere recognition of 
a defendant’s arrest record tainted his sentencing hearing. 
Unable to point to any evidence beyond the District Court’s 
mere mention of his arrest record, Ferguson has not shown 
error, much less plain error. 
Our conclusion that there was no error in this case is 
not the result of a requirement that “a record . . . be explicit in 
showing that a defendant’s bare arrest record contributed to 
the sentence,” as Ferguson characterizes the Government’s 
position. Reply Br. 1–2. But just as such reliance need not be 
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made explicit in order to constitute error, the inverse rule 
Ferguson appears to advocate—wherein any reference to 
prior arrests not leading to conviction is plain error, no matter 
how insignificant in context—is equally unwarranted. As we 
have explained, whether a district court has run afoul of the 
principles we articulated in Berry and Mateo-Medina is a 
question that cannot be divorced from the facts and 
circumstances of each sentencing hearing.  
IV 
 For the reasons stated, the District Court did not 
plainly err when it mentioned Ferguson’s prior arrest record. 
Accordingly, we will affirm its judgment of sentence. 
